And from Fox News, "Obama: Decision on Afghanistan Expected in 'Coming Weeks'":
Robert Gibbs rejected a published report that the president had authorized 13,000 additional troops that were now arriving in Afghanistan. He said those troops were part of a deployment ordered by the former Bush administration, but had not made their way to the Afghan theater by the time Obama became president. The Washington Post had reported those forces were authorized by Obama.See also, Christine Fair, "Pakistan's Partial War on Terror": The Deadly Results of Cooperation With Terrorists":
The past week's spate of suicide bombings in Pakistan and the siege of its military headquarters are again casting the spotlight on that country's war on terror. Attention will—and should—focus in particular on Islamabad's many failures to control militants on its own soil. Pakistan is now paying the heavy price for its earlier attempts to use terrorist groups as strategic tools.More at the link.
For decades Islamabad has viewed and used terrorist groups as assets to be cultivated. Before the Soviet invasion, Pakistan used Islamist militants for operations in India and Afghanistan. Today, Pakistan aids the Afghan Taliban mainly in the belief that if U.S. and international commitment to Afghanistan wanes, it would be better to be friendly with a group like the Taliban that can keep Indian influence in the country at bay—the same logic behind Pakistan's pre-2001 support for the Taliban.
At home, Pakistan has tolerated a raft of terrorist groups ostensibly linked to Kashmir, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group responsible for last year's Mumbai massacre, continues to operate under various names. Its leadership roams free and its offices remain open. Jaish-e-Mohammad, responsible for several attacks in India and against international and domestic targets within Pakistan, is similarly unconstrained. Pakistan's track record against so-called anti-Shi'a militias, such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipha-e-Sahaba-e-Pakistan, has been equally lackluster despite vicious attacks against Shi'a who are perhaps one-fourth of Pakistan's population. These varied groups are ensconced not in the unruly tribal areas, but in Pakistan's most populous and militarized province: the Punjab. Punjab hosts six army corps, yet these groups proliferate and operate with impunity literally under the nose of Pakistan's army.
Islamabad has long believed it could exploit these groups for strategic aims while preventing them from causing too much "unapproved" trouble. The government would have likely come to some modus vivendi with the Pakistan Taliban, had its leaders agreed to focus upon Afghanistan rather than Pakistan. Islamabad cracked down militarily on the Pakistani Taliban earlier this year only after it was clear that deal-making had failed. With respect to the so-called Kashmiri groups, Pakistan only sought to moderate their activities to prevent serious Indo-Pakistan crises and international pressure while maintaining their basic operational readiness.
Related: The Washington Post, "Number of U.S. Troops in Afghanistan Overlooks Thousands of Support Troops." (Via Memeorandum.)
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